Enforceability of Life Insurance Provisions
MCL 552.101(2)–(3) states that a divorce judgment or separate maintenance order shall determine all rights of the husband/wife in and to the proceeds of any policy or contract of life insurance, endowment or annuity upon the life of the other spouse, if he or she was named or designated as beneficiary. If the divorce judgment or separate maintenance order does not determine the rights of the divorced spouse to a policy of life insurance on the other, the policy shall be payable to the estate of the decedent or to the named beneficiary if the decedent has designated.
Parties who wish to be able to enforce an agreement to use life insurance to secure support or payment of property settlement debts should include language in the divorce judgment specifically stating the terms of the agreement and re-affirming the right of the recipient spouse to be named as a beneficiary of the insurance policy. WWW.ATTORNEYBANKERT.COM
Thursday, April 21, 2011
Sunday, April 3, 2011
MIDLAND BANKRUPTCY AND DIVORCE
IS YOUR CASE IN THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN BANKRUPTCY COURT? BANKRUPTCY FLINT / BAY CITY ,ATTORNEY POSTING BY Flint / Bay City Bankruptcy Attorney Terry R. Bankert 810-235-1970. Flint /BAY CITY Bankruptcy lawyer Terry R. Bankert , http://www.attorneybankert.com If you have bankruptcy questions call today 810-235-1970 this article presented in a SEO format. 1. Federal District Courts §1.4 The jurisdictional provisions in the Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984 (the 1984 amendments) resolved a constitutional problem (see Northern Pipeline Constr Co v Marathon Pipe Line Co, 458 US 50 (1982)) with the status of bankruptcy judges. These provisions, which are contained in 28 USC 1334, grant to federal district judges the power to administer bankruptcy cases and all civil proceedings connected to them. Thus, the district court is granted original and exclusive jurisdiction over all bankruptcy cases. 28 USC 1334(a). The district court is also granted original, but not exclusive, jurisdiction over all civil proceedings “arising under,” “arising in,” or “related to” bankruptcy cases. 28 USC 1334(b). However, the district court may abstain from deciding these civil proceedings “in the interest of justice, or in the interest of comity with State courts or respect for State law.” 28 USC 1334(c)(1). Finally, the district court is granted exclusive jurisdiction over all property of the debtor and property of the estate, wherever that property is located. 28 USC 1334(e).
Friday, June 18, 2010
MIDLAND DIVORCE COURT FAVORS MOM ON CHILD CUSTODY!
Midland Michigan Circuit Court Divorce Child Custody Child Parenting time Issues presented by Flint Divorce Lawyer Terry Bankert 810-235-1970
Midland Michigan Circuit Court Divorce Child Custody Child Parenting time Issues presented by Flint Divorce Lawyer Terry Bankert 810-235-1970: 1. Did the Midland Divorce Court properly grant the plaintiff-mother's petition for modification of custody, awarded her sole legal and physical custody of the two minor children, and modified the defendant-father's parenting time; 2. In a Michigan, Midland or Flint Divorce what is Proper cause/change of circumstances under MCL 722.27(1)(c); Foskett v. Foskett; People v. Gonzalez; Berger v. Berger; Vodvarka v. Grasmeyer; Fletcher v. Fletcher; Shulick v. Richards; 3.Did the Midland Divorce Court court correctly find an established custodial environment (ECE) existed as to mother- plaintiff but there was none with defendant-father; Mogle v. Scriver; Baker v. Baker; The statutory best interest factors (MCL 722.23); 4.Whether the Midland divorce court violate the defendant's due process rights to a fair tribunal and should have determined the preferences of the children; Reed v. Reed; MCL 722.23(i); Treutle v. Treutle; Bowers v. Bowers; Applicability of Stringer v. Vincent; Sinicropi v. Mazurek; McCain v. McCain
S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N C O U R T O F A P P E A L S ,UNPUBLISHED opinion, May 25, 2010 ,v No. 294177Midland Circuit Court, LC No. 06-001485-DMLISA A. DOUGLAS, f/k/a LISA A. EATON, Plaintiff-Appellee,RUSSELL E. EATON, Defendant-Appellant.Before: BANDSTRA, P.J., and BORRELLO and SHAPIRO, JJ.PER CURIAM.,e-Journal Number: 45946.Posted here by Flint Divorce Attorney Terry Bankert whose comments are CAP headline or cited [trb] for purposes or lay understanding and SEO.
FATHER LOSESThe Michigan Court of Appeals found as to the existence of proper cause to revisit the custody order was not against the great weight of the evidence, the Midland trial court's findings as to the existence of an ECE as to the parties and regarding the best interest factors were also not against the great weight of the evidence, and the Midland court did not violate the defendant-father's due process rights by making credibility determinations in plaintiff-mother's favor and by not interviewing the minor children to discover their preference, the Michigan Court of Appeals court affirmed the Midland trial court's order granting mother-plaintiff's petition for modification of custody, awarding her sole legal and physical custody of the minor children, and modifying father-defendant's parenting time.
HERE FATHER- Defendant appeals as of right the order granting MOTHER-plaintiff’s petition for modification of custody and awarding MOTHER-plaintiff sole legal and physical custody of the minor children and modifying FATHER-defendant’s parenting time.
For the reasons set forth in this opinion, we THE STATE OF MICHIGAN COURT OF APPEALS affirm THE DECISION OF THE MIDLAND DIVORCE COURT.
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORYDIVORCED IN 2007Plaintiff and defendant were divorced in June 2007. TWO MINOR CHILDRENThey had two minor children, X…(d/o/b 3/15/99) and Y…. (d/o/b 10/14/00).
ORIGINAL JOINT CUSTODY, PLAY ON WORDS PRIMARY RESIDENCE TO MOMThe divorce judgment awarded the parties joint legal and physical custody of the minor children, with the children’s primary residence being with MOTHER plaintiff. Defendant was awarded parenting time on alternating week-ends and for one evening each week on the weeks he did not have parenting time on the weekend. DAD WANTS A CHANGE 08/14/2008On August 14, 2008, defendant filed a petition for change of custody, seeking equal parenting time for the parties, with custody of the minor children alternating each week.
MOM SAYS I”LL ANSWER THAT AND RAISE A THREATENED CHANGE IN PARENTING TIMEPlaintiff filed a response to defendant’s petition for change of custody and a counter-petition for a change in parenting time that sought, among other things, to increase plaintiff’s parenting time and decrease defendant’s parenting time.
04/08/2009 MOM RAISES THE STAKES BY FILING FOR SOLE CUSTODY, she wins!!!!On April 8, 2009, plaintiff filed an amended petition for modification ofcustody, seeking sole legal and physical custody of the parties’ minor children.
MIDLAND DIVORCE COURT AGREES TO LOOK AGAIN AT MIDLAND CHILD CUSTODYThe trial court found that there was proper cause to revisit the custody order and foundthat there was an established custodial environment with plaintiff, but not with defendant.
AFTER TWO YEARS THE MIDLAND DIVORCE COURT SAYS IT IS NOT IN THE CHILDRENS BEST INTEREST TO LET THEIR FATHER SHARE JOINT CUSTODY!The trial court considered the statutory best interest factors in MCL 722.23 and found that it was inthe children’s best interests to award sole legal and physical custody to plaintiff.
FATHER REDUCED BY THE MIDLAND DIVORCE CHILD CUSTODY COURT TO BEING AN EVERY OTHER WEEKEND FATHER!HOW DID THAT HAPPEN?Defendant was awarded parenting time on alternating week-ends during the school year, from 6:00 p.m. onFriday to 6:00 p.m. on Sunday. The trial court ordered summer parenting time “according to theMidland County Co-Parenting Plan . . . .” Defendant thereafter filed a motion forreconsideration, which the trial court denied.1
II. ANALYSIS1. STANDARD OF REVIEW FOR THE MICHGIAN COURT OF APPEALS TO SECOND GUESS THE MIDLAND CHILD CUSTODY COURTThis MICHIGAN COURT OF APPEALS Court applies three standards of review in child custody cases. See Fletcher v Fletcher, 447 Mich 871, 876-877; 526 NW2d 889 (1994).
FIRST,First, the trial court’s findings of fact are reviewed under the “‘great weight of evidence’” standard and will be affirmed unless the evidence clearly preponderates in the opposite direction. Id. at 877-878, quoting MCL 722.28.A MIDLAND CHILD CUSTODY trial court’s findings regarding the existence of proper cause or a change in circumstances sufficient to reconsider a custody award and the existence of an established custodialenvironment, as well as the trial court’s findings regarding the best interest factors under MCR722.23, are reviewed under the great weight of the evidence standard. Berger v Berger, 277Mich App 700, 705; 747 NW2d 336 (2008); Vodvarka v Grasmeyer, 259 Mich App 499, 512;675 NW2d 847 (2003).
SECONDSecond, this Court reviews questions of law for clear legal error thatoccurs when a trial court incorrectly chooses, interprets, or applies the law. Berger, 277 MichApp at 706.
THIRDThird, discretionary rulings, such as custody decisions, are reviewed for an abuse ofdiscretion. Fletcher, 447 Mich at 879; Shulick v Richards, 273 Mich App 320, 323-325; 729NW2d 533 (2006).
OKAY JUST WHAT IS AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION?An abuse of discretion in matters involving child custody exists where theresult is so palpably and grossly violative of fact and logic that it evidences a perversity of will orthe exercise of passion or bias. Shulick, 273 Mich App at 324-325. The overriding concern incustody determinations is the child’s best interests. Fletcher v Fletcher, 229 Mich App 19, 29;581 NW2d 11 (1998).2.
PROPER CAUSE/CHANGE OF CIRCUMSTANCES UNDER MCL 722.27(1)(c)FATHER -Defendant first argues that there was not proper cause to modify the custody order. Atrial court may modify a custody award only if the moving party first establishes proper cause ora change in circumstances. MCL 722.27(1)(c); Vodvarka, 259 Mich App at 508-509.
WHY DO WE HAVE THIS BURDEN TO CHANGE CHILD CUSTODY?The goal of MCL 722.27 is to minimize unwarranted and disruptive changes of custody orders, exceptunder the most compelling circumstances. Foskett v Foskett, 247 Mich App 1, 6; 634 NW2d 363(2001). Thus, a party seeking a change in child custody is required, as a threshold matter, to firstdemonstrate to the trial court either proper cause or a change in circumstances. Vodvarka, 259Mich App at 508.
NO PROVE , NO GO FORWARDIf a party fails to do so, the trial court may not hold a child custody hearing.Id. In Vodvarka, this Court explained the terms “proper cause” and “change of circumstances”:
WHAT IS PROPER CAUSE IN MIDLAND CHILD CUSTODY?[T]o establish “proper cause” necessary to revisit a custody order, a movant mustprove by a preponderance of the evidence the existence of an appropriate groundfor legal action to be taken by the trial court. The appropriate ground(s) should berelevant to at least one of the twelve statutory best interest factors, and must be ofsuch magnitude to have a significant effect on the child’s well-being. When amovant has demonstrated such proper cause, the trial court can then engage in areevaluation of the statutory best interest factors.* * *
YOU LOOK AT YOUR LAST ORDER ANDS ASK “WHATS NEW”![I]n order to establish a “change of circumstances,” a movant must prove that,since the entry of the last custody order, the conditions surrounding custody of thechild, which have or could have a significant effect on the child’s well-being,have materially changed.
NEW ,THAT SIGNIFICANTLY AFFECTS THE CHILDAgain, not just any change will suffice, for over timethere will always be some changes in a child’s environment, behavior, and wellbeing.
MORE THAN NORMAL LIFE CHANGESInstead, the evidence must demonstrate something more than the normallife changes (both good and bad) that occur during the life of a child, and theremust be at least some evidence that the material changes have had or will almostcertainly have an effect on the child. This too will be a determination made onthe basis of the facts of each case, with the relevance of the facts presented beinggauged by the statutory best interest factors. [Vodvarka, 259 Mich App at 512-514 (emphasis in original).]
FATHER SOUGHT A CHANGE IN CUSTODY !IN RETALIATION TO MOTHERS MOTION!In this case, defendant himself sought a change in custody, and in his petition for changeof custody, he argued that there had been a substantial change of circumstances since the entry ofthe judgment of divorce.
WHAT DID FATHER SAY THE CHANGE WAS?In his petition, defendant articulated numerous specific instances thatconstituted a change of circumstances, including…
ONEplaintiff’s strict enforcement of the parenting time schedule in the judgment of divorce,
TWOplaintiff’s violations of the inherent rights of the minor children,
THREEplaintiff’s refusal to let defendant see the minor children on a particular weekend for amatter of hours per defendant’s special request,
FOURplaintiff’s failure to pick up the children after defendant exercised parenting time with them,
FIVE…BINGO...IT'S ALL ABOUT BASEBALLproblems between the parties regarding one of the minor children’s participation on a baseball team that was coached by defendant, SIXand a conflict between the parties that resulted in a scene at the minor children’s baseball practice.
COURT DID NOT THINK DAD HAD ENOUGHThe MIDLAND CHILD CUSTODY trial court specifically rejected defendant’s contention that plaintiff’s Strict enforcement of the parenting time schedule in the judgment of divorce constituted a change incircumstances. In reviewing the specific instances cited by defendant, the trial court stated thatthe parties’ problems with co-parenting were more properly characterized as proper cause torevisit the custody order, rather than a change of circumstances sufficient to revisit custody:The specific instances raised by the Defendant in his petition were alsothoroughly discussed at the hearing through testimony by both parties and theirwitnesses.
MIDLAND CHILD CUSTODY COURT DECIDED THE PARENTS CANNOT CO- PARENTThe situations are clear illustrations of the parties’ current inability toco-parent their children in a manner geared toward the best interests of thechildren. The Court does not feel, however, that the contention between theparties is appropriately categorized as a change of circumstances.
WOW!.... I SHOULD HAVE THOUGHT OF THAT. ...IN JOINT, LACK OF CO-PARENTING IS A CHANGE IN CIRCUMSTANCESInstead, the coparenting problems should be classified as proper cause by which to revisit thecurrent order. The issues surrounding the parties’ inability to co-parent, and theinstances in which those issues have manifested themselves, are clearly relevantto the parties’ willingness and ability to encourage and facilitate a closerelationship between the child and the other parent. The facilitation andencouragement of such relationship is one of the twelve best interest factors, andbased on the testimony presented, the problems between the parties are having asignificant effect on the well-being of the children involved in this case.Therefore, the Court finds proper cause exists to revisit the current custody order.
DAD LOST HIS ABILITY TO CHALLENGE MOM'S LACK OF CHANGE IN CIRCUMSTANCES WHEN HE ARGUES IN HIS OWN PETITION THERE IS.It is arguable that defendant has waived his argument that there was not proper cause orchange of circumstances sufficient to revisit the custody order by asserting in his petition forchange of custody that there was proper cause to revisit the custody issue. Error requiringreversal cannot be error to which the aggrieved party contributed by plan or negligence. Peoplev Gonzalez, 256 Mich App 212, 224; 663 NW2d 499 (2003).
MIDLAND CHILD CUSTODY COURT SAID DAD DID NOT BRING ENOUGH TO THE TABLEEven if defendant has not waived his argument regarding the lack of proper cause or change of circumstances, his argument is without merit.
PRACTICE NOTE -MOTHER BROUGHT WITNESS TO COURT ON FATHERS NON ABILITY TO CO PARENT.Defendant argues that there was not proper cause to revisit the custody issuebecause the only testimony that the parties’ inability to co-parent the children was affecting thechildren came from plaintiff and plaintiff’s witnesses.
LOCAL COURT GETS TO LOOK AT CREDIBILITYDefendant’s argument in this regard essentially asks this Court to interfere with the factfinder’s duty to determine the credibility of witnesses and the weight of the evidence, something which this Court cannot do. MCR 2.613(C); Berger, 277 Mich App at 715.
MIDLAND CHILD CUSTODY COURT GOT IT RIGHTAs the trial court observed, one of the statutory bestinterest factors is “[t]he willingness and ability of each of the parties to facilitate and encourage aclose and continuing parent-child relationship between the child and the other parent or the childand the parents.” MCL 722.23(j). The trial court’s finding that the parties were unable to coparentand that this affected the parties’ ability to facilitate a close relationship between thechildren and the other parent was based on its determinations regarding the credibility of thewitnesses and its weighing of the evidence. The trial court’s findings were not against the greatweight of the evidence, and the trial court properly found that proper cause existed to revisit thecustody order.2.
ESTABLISHED CUSTODIAL ENVIRONMENTFATHER Defendant next argues that the trial court erred in ruling that an established custodialenvironment existed with respect to plaintiff and in ruling that there was no established custodialenvironment with respect to defendant. As noted above, whether an established custodialenvironment exists is a question of fact that this Court must affirm unless the trial court’s findingis against the great weight of the evidence. Berger, 277 Mich App at 706. “A finding is againstthe great weight of the evidence if the evidence clearly preponderates in the opposite direction.”Id. The trial court must address whether an established custodial environment exists before itmakes a determination regarding the child’s best interests. Mogle v Scriver, 241 Mich App 192,197; 614 NW2d 696 (2000).
WHAT IS AN ESTABISHED CUSTODIAL ENVIRONMENT?“An established custodial environment is one of significantduration in which a parent provides care, discipline, love, guidance, and attention that isappropriate to the age and individual needs of the child. ITS PHYSICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICALIt is both a physical and psychologicalenvironment that fosters a relationship between custodian and child and is marked by security,stability, and permanence.” Berger, 277 Mich App at 706, citing Baker v Baker, 411 Mich 567,579-580; 309 NW2d 532 (1981).
OVER A PERIOD OF TIMEAn established custodial environment exists “if over anappreciable time the child naturally looks to the custodian in that environment for guidance,discipline, the necessities of life, and parental comfort,” MCL 722.27(1)(c), and “the relationshipbetween the custodian and the child is marked by qualities of security, stability andpermanence.” Baker, 411 Mich at 579-580.
BOTH PARENTS CAN HAVE ITAn established custodial environment may existwith both parents where a child looks to both the mother and father for guidance, discipline, andthe necessities of life. Foskett, 247 Mich App at 8; Mogle, 241 Mich App at 197-198.The trial court found that there was an established custodial environment with plaintiff,but that there was not an established custodial environment with defendant:
MIDLAND CHILD CUSTODY COURT FINDS FOR MOMCourt finds that there is an established custodial environment with thePlaintiff in this case. WHY?
ONEPlaintiff was the children’s primary caregiver from theirbirth, staying home with the children while Defendant worked.
TWOThis arrangementcontinued until Defendant’s retirement in 2005. At that time, Plaintiff did returnto work, but she has continued to be a constant, positive presence in the children’slives.
THREEIt is clear that the children look to her for guidance, discipline, comfort andthe fulfillment of their needs.FOUROn the other hand, the relationship the boys have with their father has notbeen shown to be of the same positive nature as that with their mother. The boyshave spent more time with their father since his retirement than they did in thefirst years of their lives.
FIVEHowever, that time has been sporadic and not fosteredthe same type of relationship with their father as the boys have with their mother.
SIXThe time Defendant shares with the boys is primarily spent engaging in physicaland outdoor activities. It seems that the boys look to their father more as someoneto have fun with than someone who provides them guidance in their lives.
SEVENWhile it does appear that the boys listen to their father’s directives, they seem to do sobecause they fear his reactions more than they respect his authority as a parent.
DAD WAS NOT A PARENTING PARENTThe Court finds no established custodial environment with Defendant.The trial court’s finding that there was an established custodial environment between thechildren and plaintiff was not against the great weight of the evidence.
KIDS ARE MORE SECURE WITH MOMThere was evidence thatthe relationship between plaintiff and the children had qualities of security, stability, andpermanence.
MOMS HOME WAS THE PRIMARY RSSIDENCEFurthermore, plaintiff’s residence had been the children’s primary residence sincethe parties divorced in July 2007, and the children spend the majority of their days and nightswith plaintiff. As for defendant, the evidence does not clearly preponderate towards a finding ofan established custodial environment. According to defendant, the trial court downplayeddefendant’s role in the children’s lives and ignored credible witnesses that positively describedthe children’s relationship with defendant.
DAD DOES LOVE HIS CHILDRENIt is true that there was testimony that defendantloves his children and that he generally exercised his parenting time with the children,participated with their baseball and school activities, and enjoyed outdoor activities with them,such as hunting, fishing and golfing. Furthermore, there was testimony that defendant guidedand disciplined the children.
DADS HOME LACKED SECURITYHowever, there was also evidence that tended to show that therelationship between defendant and the children did not have qualities of security and stability.
ONE...DAD IS AN ANGRY GUYFor example, there was evidence that defendant sometimes became angry when the childrenwere present and that his anger affected the children,
TWO..DAD PUT THE DRAMA INFRONT OF THE CHILDRENthere was evidence that defendant made custodial exchanges traumatic, and there was evidence that defendant sometimes did not exercise his parenting time when he was expected to.
THREEFurthermore, there was evidence to support the trialcourt’s finding that defendant was the “fun” parent with whom the boys liked to hang out andhave a good time.
LOCAL COURT GETS TO DECIDETo the extent that the trial court’s conclusion that there was not an established custodialenvironment with defendant involved credibility determinations and the possible rejection ofevidence presented by defendant, we note that the existence of an established custodialenvironment is a factual inquiry, and we defer to the trial court’s determinations regarding theweight of the evidence and the credibility of witnesses. MCR 2.613(C); Berger, 277 Mich Appat 715. We find that the evidence does not clearly preponderate against the trial court’s findingsregarding the existence of an established custodial environment with respect to plaintiff and thelack of an established custodial environment with respect to defendant. The trial court’s findingswere not against the great weight of the evidence, and the trial court did not err in finding that anestablished custodial environment existed with plaintiff, but not with defendant.3.
STATUTORY BEST INTEREST FACTORSDefendant -FATHER next argues that the trial court’s findings with respect to the statutory bestinterest factors were against the great weight of the evidence.
BEST INTEREST FACTORSTo determine child custody, thetrial court must consider the statutory best interest factors in MCL 722.23:As used in this act, “best interests of the child” means the sum total of thefollowing factors to be considered, evaluated, and determined by the court:
(a) The love, affection, and other emotional ties existing between the partiesinvolved and the child.
(b) The capacity and disposition of the parties involved to give the child love,affection, and guidance and to continue the education and raising of the child inhis or her religion or creed, if any.
(c) The capacity and disposition of the parties involved to provide the childwith food, clothing, medical care or other remedial care recognized and permittedunder the laws of this state in place of medical care, and other material needs.
(d) The length of time the child has lived in a stable, satisfactory environment,and the desirability of maintaining continuity.
(e) The permanence, as a family unit, of the existing or proposed custodialhome or homes.
(f) The moral fitness of the parties involved.
(g) The mental and physical health of the parties involved.
(h) The home, school, and community record of the child.
(i) The reasonable preference of the child, if the court considers the child tobe of sufficient age to express preference.
(j) The willingness and ability of each of the parties to facilitate andencourage a close and continuing parent-child relationship between the child andthe other parent or the child and the parents.
(k) Domestic violence, regardless of whether the violence was directedagainst or witnessed by the child.
(l) Any other factor considered by the court to be relevant to a particular childcustody dispute.
The trial court found the parties equal for factors (c) and (f). The trial court found thatfactors (a), (b), and (h) favored plaintiff, that factor (d) slightly favored plaintiff, and that factors(e), (g), (j) and (k) strongly favored plaintiff. The trial court did not inverview the minorchildren and therefore did not favor either party under (i). Furthermore, the trial court did notconsider any other factor under (l).
AThe trial court found in plaintiff’s favor for factor (a). Defendant attacks the trial court’sfinding regarding this factor on the basis that the trial court disregarded the testimony ofunbiased defense witnesses. As the trier of fact, the trial court was in the best position todetermine the credibility of witnesses and determine what weight to give the evidence. MCR2.613(C); Berger, 277 Mich App at 715. The trial court apparently found the testimony ofplaintiff and her witnesses more credible in this regard than the testimony of defendant and hiswitnesses. The trial court’s finding for factor (a) was not against the great weight of theevidence.
BThe trial court also found in plaintiff’s favor for factor (b). The trial court found theparties’ capacity to continue the education and raising of the children as Catholics to besignificant regarding this factor and found that defendant was “not consistent with delivering theboys to religious activities during his parenting time.” There was evidence that plaintiff led thereligious training of the parties’ children and evidence regarding defendant’s lack of participationand involvement in the children’s religious education and even defendant’s inhibition of thechildren’s religious training. The trial court’s finding regarding this factor was not against thegreat weight of the evidence.
DThe trial court found that factor (d) slightly favored plaintiff because of the children’sfamiliarity with plaintiff’s home. Defendant argues that the trial court failed to note that theminor children had been spending significant time with defendant in defendant’s new home sinceJanuary 2007. This may be true, but the evidence established that the minor children spent themajority of their days and nights in plaintiff’s home and that the environment in plaintiff’s homewas stable. The trial court did not err in slightly favoring plaintiff under this factor.
EThe trial court found that factor (e) strongly favored plaintiff. There was evidence thatplaintiff, who had not remarried, was in a long-term relationship with a man and that the manresided in plaintiff’s home and had a good relationship with the minor children. Defendant hadjust remarried the very month of the custody trial. Defendant’s wife was a woman he had metonline. He met her in person for the first time in December 2008 and they spent some timetogether for about five weeks from March 25, 2009, until they were married on May 3, 2009.The minor children spent some time with defendant’s wife during these visits, but she did notappear to have given a lot of consideration to her role as step-mother to the minor children, asevidenced by her statement that she “never really thought about being their step-mom.”Defendant takes issue with the trial court’s conclusion that defendant places little valueon his relationships with women. It can be inferred from certain evidence that defendant placeslittle value on his relationships with women. There was evidence that defendant called plaintiffvulgar names, sometimes in the children’s presence, and he apparently dated a woman who hemet online because she lived near an author of books that one of his sons liked to read.According to defendant, “the only reason [he] wanted to interact with” the woman was to meetthis author. Thus, there was evidence to permit the inference to support the trial court’s findingthat defendant places little value on his relationships with women. Furthermore, given theevidence, and inferences therefrom, regarding the permanence of the parties’ respective homes,we conclude that the trial court’s finding regarding this factor was not against the great weight ofthe evidence.
GDefendant argues that the trial court erred in strongly favoring plaintiff under factor (g),the mental and physical health of the parties involved. Defendant was disabled from themilitary. He described the nature of his disability as including injuries to both knees and hisright shoulder. He also stated that he ingested gas during Operation Desert Storm and that hehad stomach problems and irritable bowel syndrome. Furthermore, defendant testified that hesuffered from depression, anxiety, and post-traumatic stress disorder. In contrast, plaintiff doesnot have any significant physical or mental health issues. The trial court’s finding regarding thisfactor was not against the great weight of the evidence.
HDefendant does not advance any meaningful argument that the trial court erred infavoring plaintiff under factor (h). “A party abandons a claim when it fails to make a meaningfulargument in support of its position.” Berger, 277 Mich App at 712.
JDefendant argues that the trial court wrongfully strongly favored plaintiff under factor (j).Defendant’s argument in this regard is limited to listing ways in which plaintiff attempted toundermine defendant’s relationship with the children. We again note that a party waives a claimby failing to make a meaningful argument in support of his position. Id. To the extent that thisfactor depended on credibility determinations, the trial court is in the best position to determinethe credibility of witnesses and weigh the evidence, and this Court must give deference to thetrial court’s superior abilities in this regard. MCR 2.613(C); Berger, 277 Mich App at 715.
KDefendant also argues that the trial court erred in strongly favoring plaintiff under factor(k), domestic violence. According to defendant, plaintiff was the controlling party, and she wasverbally and emotionally abusive. Defendant asserts that even though plaintiff called the policeon several occasions during the marriage, no police complaints were ever filed and defendantwas never charged with domestic violence. There was evidence that defendant blockedplaintiff’s car with his truck at a baseball game because he was angry at her, that he threatened to kill plaintiff’s boyfriend, that he was sometimes “volatile,” and that plaintiff had sought help from law enforcement on four occasions after the parties were separated because of defendant’sconduct. A woman who saw defendant block plaintiff’s car in at the baseball game laterapproached plaintiff and told plaintiff that she worked for a domestic violence and sexual assaultshelter and that plaintiff should call if she needed anything. Therefore, even without evidence ofa criminal complaint or that defendant was charged without domestic violence, the trial court’sfinding regarding this factor was not against the great weight of the evidence.In sum, the trial court’s findings of fact regarding the best interest factors were notagainst the great weight of the evidence.4.
DUE PROCESSDefendant finally argues that the trial court violated his due process right to a fairtribunal. According to defendant, the trial court violated his due process rights by failing to holda hearing to determine the preferences of the minor children, MCR 722.23(i), and by deferring tothe report of psychologist Dr. Tracy Allan without taking into consideration any of defendant’switnesses or exhibits in rendering its opinion.We review de novo issues of constitutional law. Sinicropi v Mazurek, 273 Mich App149, 155; 729 NW2d 256 (2006).
LIFE AND LIBERTYThe Michigan Constitution and the United States Constitution both preclude thegovernment from depriving a person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law. USConst, Am V; Const 1963, art 1, § 17; Reed v Reed, 265 Mich App 131, 159; 693 NW2d 825(2005). “Parents have a significant interest in the companionship, care, custody, andmanagement of their children, and the interest is an element of liberty protected by due process.”In re JK, 468 Mich 202, 210; 661 NW2d 216 (2003).
JUST WHAT IS DUE PROCESSThere are two types of due process:procedural due process and substantive due process. By Lo Oil Co v Dep’t of Treasury, 267Mich App 19, 32-33; 703 NW2d 822 (2005). Procedural due process requires notice and ameaningful opportunity to be heard before an impartial decision maker. Mettler Walloon, LLC vMelrose Twp, 281 Mich App 184, 213-214; 761 NW2d 293 (2008). Substantive due process isconcerned with the arbitrary deprivation of a liberty or property interest. Id. at 201.The trial court’s rejection of defendant’s witnesses and defendant’s own testimony andacceptance of plaintiff’s witnesses and evidence did not deprive defendant of his due processrights. Once again, defendant’s argument is tantamount to a rejection of the trial court’scredibility determinations. As stated previously, this Court defers to the trial court’s superiorability to make determinations regarding the credibility of witnesses and the weight of evidence.MCR 2.613(C); Berger, 277 Mich App at 715. The trial court’s apparent conclusion thatplaintiff’s evidence was more credible or that defendant’s evidence was incredible does not meanthat the trial court failed to consider defendant’s testimony and other evidence. The finder offact does not violate a party’s due process rights by finding the party’s evidence incredible orless credible than evidence presented by the opposing party. Furthermore, the fact that the trialcourt may not have mentioned certain portions of defendant’s evidence does not mean that thetrial court failed to consider defendant’s evidence. The trial court need not comment on everymatter in evidence. Sinicropi, 273 Mich App at 180. Defendant’s argument in this regard iswithout merit.In addition, the trial court did not violate defendant’s due process rights by not holding ahearing to determine the custody preferences of the minor children under MCL 722.23(i). Underfactor (i), the trial court must consider “[t]he reasonable preference of the child, if the courtconsiders the child to be of sufficient age to express preference.” MCL 722.23(i); Treutle vTreutle, 197 Mich App 690, 694; 495 NW2d 836 (1992). In this case, the minor children wereeight and ten years old at the time of trial. This Court has stated that children of six years of ageare generally old enough to express a preference. Bowers v Bowers, 190 Mich App 51, 55-56;475 NW2d 394 (1991). The trial court did not interview the minor children to ascertain theirpreferences.
SHOULD THE LOCAL COURT HAVE LISTENED CLOSER TO THE CHILDREN?Defendant cites Stringer v Vincent, 161 Mich App 429; 411 NW2d 474 (1987), in supportof his contention that the trial court violated his due process rights by failing to consider thereasonable preference of the children. In Stringer, which involved the defendant’s petition forchange of custody, this Court stated: “[t]he trial court’s failure to interview the children wasitself error requiring reversal.” Id. at 434. We find Stringer to be distinguishable from theinstant case, however, because in Stringer, the trial court made a custody decision withoutholding an evidentiary hearing at all, on the basis of the pleadings and a friend of the courtreport, which the parties had not agreed could be considered as evidence. Id. at 432-433. Wereversed because of the trial court’s failure to hold an evidentiary hearing and consider the bestinterest factors. Id. at 433. In so doing, we stated: “[t]he trial court could not have consideredthe eleven factors set out in the definition of a child’s best interests since it had been presentedwith no evidence.” Id. Unlike the facts in Stringer, in this case, the trial court held anevidentiary hearing and considered the best interest factors and made findings regarding thosefactors. Although the trial court did not ascertain the children’s preference under factor (i), itfound most of the best interest factors favored plaintiff (and that four factors “strongly” favoredplaintiff) and that the parties were equal for two factors. Significantly, the trial court did not findin defendant’s favor for any of the best interest factors. The trial court’s holding of anevidentiary hearing and consideration of the best interest factors in the instant case distinguishesit from Stringer. Furthermore, in requiring the trial court to interview the children to determinetheir preference in Stringer, this Court noted that its statements regarding factor (i) were madeonly “to provide guidance to the trial court on remand.” Id.
WE HAVE SAID THIS BEFOREMore recently, this Court has held that the trial court’s failure to consider the preferenceof the child under factor (i) does not require reversal if the parties did not ask the trial court tospeak to the child regarding his or her preference and the child’s preference would not havechanged the trial court’s ruling. Sinicropi, 273 Mich App at 182-183. In Sinicropi, we stated:[Defendant] also takes issue with the fact that the trial court did notconsider the child’s preference under factor i (child’s preference). The trial courtstated that it could not consider the child’s preference because none of the partiespresented him for an interview. We note that the parties stood mute when the trialcourt made this statement, and there is no indication in the record that [defendant]wished or requested that the trial court speak to the child regarding his preference.This fact distinguishes the case from Flaherty v Smith, 87 Mich App 561, 564-565; 274 NW2d 72 (1978); Lewis v Lewis, 73 Mich App 563, 564; 252 NW2d237 (1977), and In re Custody of James B, 66 Mich App 133, 134; 238 NW2d 550(1975), in which the trial court either declined or refused to interview the childrenon request. We recognize that “[a] trial court must consider, evaluate, anddetermine each of the factors contained in [MCL 722.23]” when determining achild’s best interests. Mann v Mann, 190 Mich App 526, 536; 476 NW2d 439(1991). Assuming that the child, who was six years old when the custody hearingwas conducted, was of sufficient age to express a preference, and assuming thatthe trial court erred in not interviewing the child when neither party apparentlywished to have the child appear, reversal is not warranted because had the childexpressed a preference, it would not have changed the trial court’s ruling, giventhe court’s overall statements and strong feelings regarding what was best for thechild . . . . [Sinicropi, 273 Mich App at 182-183.]The facts of the instant case are similar to the facts in Sinicropi. In this case, there is noindication that defendant presented the minor children to the court for an interview.2 Moreover,there is no indication that the trial court declined or refused to interview the children on request.In addition, even if defendant had asked the trial court to speak with the minor children toascertain their preference, in the present case, like in Sinicropi, the trial court’s findingsregarding the other best interest factors and statements regarding the best interests of the childrenindicate that the minor children’s preference would not have changed the trial court’s ruling. Inthe present case, the trial court did not find any of the best interest factors in favor of plaintiff.Moreover, even if the children had articulated a preference to be in the custody of defendant, thebest interest factors need not be given equal weight, McCain v McCain, 229 Mich App 123, 131;580 NW2d 485 (1998), and a child’s preference does not automatically outweigh all other bestinterest factors, Treutle, 197 Mich App at 694, which the trial court found primarily in favor of2 There is an indication that defendant wished to have the trial court speak with the minorchildren regarding their preference even though he did not present them to the trial court for aninterview. On the record on the last day of trial, May 28, 2009, the trial court stated that in lieuof closing arguments, it wanted the parties to prepare written proposed findings of fact andconclusions of law. The trial court stated that it would give the parties 14 days to prepare theseclosing briefs, which would have made them due on June 11, 2009. Thereafter, counsel forplaintiff advised the trial court that school for the minor children was out on June 12 and thatplaintiff “would appreciate any speed that you could lend to the decision, especially as it relatesto the summer break parenting time.” The trial court then stated that it was willing to shorten thetimetable to facilitate an earlier decision, but counsel for defendant made comments thatindicated that it would be difficult for her to complete the document any earlier than June 11,2009. The trial court ultimately left the June 11, 2009, deadline intact, and defendant filed hisclosing brief with the trial court on June 11, 2009. In his closing brief, defendant asserted that“the preference of the children should be determined by this court.” Under the facts of this case,such a statement, assuming that it constitutes a request that the trial court speak with the minorchildren to ascertain their preference, is not a timely request for the trial court to interview theminor children to ascertain their preferences, when there is no evidence that defendant had thechildren available so that the trial court could speak to them that day, and defendant knew thatthe children would be out of school on June 12, and knew that the trial court desired to issue itsdecision before that date. In fact, the trial court issued its order and opinion on June 11, 2009,and defendant’s brief on appeal indicates that the trial court actually rendered its opinion beforereceiving defendant’s closing brief, although it is impossible to verify this because there is notime stamp on either the closing brief or the opinion. Significantly, defendant’s motion forreconsideration did not include any argument regarding the trial court’s failure to ascertain theminor children’s preference under MCL 722.23(i).plaintiff. The trial court did not violate defendant’s due process rights by not interviewing theminor children to determine their preference under factor (i).
III. CONCLUSIONIn sum, the MIDLAND CHILD CUSTODY trial court’s findings regarding the existence of proper cause to revisit thecustody order were not against the great weight of the evidence. In addition, the trial court’sfindings regarding the existence of an established custodial environment with respect to plaintiffand defendant and regarding the best interest factors also were not against the great weight of theevidence. Finally, the trial court did not violate defendant’s due process rights by makingcredibility determinations in plaintiff’s favor and by not interviewing the minor children todetermine their preference.
MICHIGAN COURT OF APPEALS AGREES WITH THE MIDLAND CHILD CUSTODY COURTAffirmed. Plaintiff, being the prevailing party, may tax costs pursuant to MCR 7.219./s/ Richard A. Bandstra,/s/ Stephen L. Borrello,/s/ Douglas B. ShapiroPosted here by
Terry R. Bankerthttp://attorneybankert.com/Or http://dumpmyspouse.com/
[1]GenerallyS T A T E O F M I C H I G A N C O U R T O F A P P E A L S ,UNPUBLISHED opinion, May 25, 2010 ,v No. 294177Midland Circuit Court, LC No. 06-001485-DMLISA A. DOUGLAS, f/k/a LISA A. EATON, Plaintiff-Appellee,RUSSELL E. EATON, Defendant-Appellant.Before: BANDSTRA, P.J., and BORRELLO and SHAPIRO, JJ.PER CURIAM.,e-Journal Number: 45946.Posted here by Flint Divorce Attorney Terry Bankert whose comments are CAP headline or [] for purposes or lay understanding and SEO.
Midland Michigan Circuit Court Divorce Child Custody Child Parenting time Issues presented by Flint Divorce Lawyer Terry Bankert 810-235-1970: 1. Did the Midland Divorce Court properly grant the plaintiff-mother's petition for modification of custody, awarded her sole legal and physical custody of the two minor children, and modified the defendant-father's parenting time; 2. In a Michigan, Midland or Flint Divorce what is Proper cause/change of circumstances under MCL 722.27(1)(c); Foskett v. Foskett; People v. Gonzalez; Berger v. Berger; Vodvarka v. Grasmeyer; Fletcher v. Fletcher; Shulick v. Richards; 3.Did the Midland Divorce Court court correctly find an established custodial environment (ECE) existed as to mother- plaintiff but there was none with defendant-father; Mogle v. Scriver; Baker v. Baker; The statutory best interest factors (MCL 722.23); 4.Whether the Midland divorce court violate the defendant's due process rights to a fair tribunal and should have determined the preferences of the children; Reed v. Reed; MCL 722.23(i); Treutle v. Treutle; Bowers v. Bowers; Applicability of Stringer v. Vincent; Sinicropi v. Mazurek; McCain v. McCain
S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N C O U R T O F A P P E A L S ,UNPUBLISHED opinion, May 25, 2010 ,v No. 294177Midland Circuit Court, LC No. 06-001485-DMLISA A. DOUGLAS, f/k/a LISA A. EATON, Plaintiff-Appellee,RUSSELL E. EATON, Defendant-Appellant.Before: BANDSTRA, P.J., and BORRELLO and SHAPIRO, JJ.PER CURIAM.,e-Journal Number: 45946.Posted here by Flint Divorce Attorney Terry Bankert whose comments are CAP headline or cited [trb] for purposes or lay understanding and SEO.
FATHER LOSESThe Michigan Court of Appeals found as to the existence of proper cause to revisit the custody order was not against the great weight of the evidence, the Midland trial court's findings as to the existence of an ECE as to the parties and regarding the best interest factors were also not against the great weight of the evidence, and the Midland court did not violate the defendant-father's due process rights by making credibility determinations in plaintiff-mother's favor and by not interviewing the minor children to discover their preference, the Michigan Court of Appeals court affirmed the Midland trial court's order granting mother-plaintiff's petition for modification of custody, awarding her sole legal and physical custody of the minor children, and modifying father-defendant's parenting time.
HERE FATHER- Defendant appeals as of right the order granting MOTHER-plaintiff’s petition for modification of custody and awarding MOTHER-plaintiff sole legal and physical custody of the minor children and modifying FATHER-defendant’s parenting time.
For the reasons set forth in this opinion, we THE STATE OF MICHIGAN COURT OF APPEALS affirm THE DECISION OF THE MIDLAND DIVORCE COURT.
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORYDIVORCED IN 2007Plaintiff and defendant were divorced in June 2007. TWO MINOR CHILDRENThey had two minor children, X…(d/o/b 3/15/99) and Y…. (d/o/b 10/14/00).
ORIGINAL JOINT CUSTODY, PLAY ON WORDS PRIMARY RESIDENCE TO MOMThe divorce judgment awarded the parties joint legal and physical custody of the minor children, with the children’s primary residence being with MOTHER plaintiff. Defendant was awarded parenting time on alternating week-ends and for one evening each week on the weeks he did not have parenting time on the weekend. DAD WANTS A CHANGE 08/14/2008On August 14, 2008, defendant filed a petition for change of custody, seeking equal parenting time for the parties, with custody of the minor children alternating each week.
MOM SAYS I”LL ANSWER THAT AND RAISE A THREATENED CHANGE IN PARENTING TIMEPlaintiff filed a response to defendant’s petition for change of custody and a counter-petition for a change in parenting time that sought, among other things, to increase plaintiff’s parenting time and decrease defendant’s parenting time.
04/08/2009 MOM RAISES THE STAKES BY FILING FOR SOLE CUSTODY, she wins!!!!On April 8, 2009, plaintiff filed an amended petition for modification ofcustody, seeking sole legal and physical custody of the parties’ minor children.
MIDLAND DIVORCE COURT AGREES TO LOOK AGAIN AT MIDLAND CHILD CUSTODYThe trial court found that there was proper cause to revisit the custody order and foundthat there was an established custodial environment with plaintiff, but not with defendant.
AFTER TWO YEARS THE MIDLAND DIVORCE COURT SAYS IT IS NOT IN THE CHILDRENS BEST INTEREST TO LET THEIR FATHER SHARE JOINT CUSTODY!The trial court considered the statutory best interest factors in MCL 722.23 and found that it was inthe children’s best interests to award sole legal and physical custody to plaintiff.
FATHER REDUCED BY THE MIDLAND DIVORCE CHILD CUSTODY COURT TO BEING AN EVERY OTHER WEEKEND FATHER!HOW DID THAT HAPPEN?Defendant was awarded parenting time on alternating week-ends during the school year, from 6:00 p.m. onFriday to 6:00 p.m. on Sunday. The trial court ordered summer parenting time “according to theMidland County Co-Parenting Plan . . . .” Defendant thereafter filed a motion forreconsideration, which the trial court denied.1
II. ANALYSIS1. STANDARD OF REVIEW FOR THE MICHGIAN COURT OF APPEALS TO SECOND GUESS THE MIDLAND CHILD CUSTODY COURTThis MICHIGAN COURT OF APPEALS Court applies three standards of review in child custody cases. See Fletcher v Fletcher, 447 Mich 871, 876-877; 526 NW2d 889 (1994).
FIRST,First, the trial court’s findings of fact are reviewed under the “‘great weight of evidence’” standard and will be affirmed unless the evidence clearly preponderates in the opposite direction. Id. at 877-878, quoting MCL 722.28.A MIDLAND CHILD CUSTODY trial court’s findings regarding the existence of proper cause or a change in circumstances sufficient to reconsider a custody award and the existence of an established custodialenvironment, as well as the trial court’s findings regarding the best interest factors under MCR722.23, are reviewed under the great weight of the evidence standard. Berger v Berger, 277Mich App 700, 705; 747 NW2d 336 (2008); Vodvarka v Grasmeyer, 259 Mich App 499, 512;675 NW2d 847 (2003).
SECONDSecond, this Court reviews questions of law for clear legal error thatoccurs when a trial court incorrectly chooses, interprets, or applies the law. Berger, 277 MichApp at 706.
THIRDThird, discretionary rulings, such as custody decisions, are reviewed for an abuse ofdiscretion. Fletcher, 447 Mich at 879; Shulick v Richards, 273 Mich App 320, 323-325; 729NW2d 533 (2006).
OKAY JUST WHAT IS AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION?An abuse of discretion in matters involving child custody exists where theresult is so palpably and grossly violative of fact and logic that it evidences a perversity of will orthe exercise of passion or bias. Shulick, 273 Mich App at 324-325. The overriding concern incustody determinations is the child’s best interests. Fletcher v Fletcher, 229 Mich App 19, 29;581 NW2d 11 (1998).2.
PROPER CAUSE/CHANGE OF CIRCUMSTANCES UNDER MCL 722.27(1)(c)FATHER -Defendant first argues that there was not proper cause to modify the custody order. Atrial court may modify a custody award only if the moving party first establishes proper cause ora change in circumstances. MCL 722.27(1)(c); Vodvarka, 259 Mich App at 508-509.
WHY DO WE HAVE THIS BURDEN TO CHANGE CHILD CUSTODY?The goal of MCL 722.27 is to minimize unwarranted and disruptive changes of custody orders, exceptunder the most compelling circumstances. Foskett v Foskett, 247 Mich App 1, 6; 634 NW2d 363(2001). Thus, a party seeking a change in child custody is required, as a threshold matter, to firstdemonstrate to the trial court either proper cause or a change in circumstances. Vodvarka, 259Mich App at 508.
NO PROVE , NO GO FORWARDIf a party fails to do so, the trial court may not hold a child custody hearing.Id. In Vodvarka, this Court explained the terms “proper cause” and “change of circumstances”:
WHAT IS PROPER CAUSE IN MIDLAND CHILD CUSTODY?[T]o establish “proper cause” necessary to revisit a custody order, a movant mustprove by a preponderance of the evidence the existence of an appropriate groundfor legal action to be taken by the trial court. The appropriate ground(s) should berelevant to at least one of the twelve statutory best interest factors, and must be ofsuch magnitude to have a significant effect on the child’s well-being. When amovant has demonstrated such proper cause, the trial court can then engage in areevaluation of the statutory best interest factors.* * *
YOU LOOK AT YOUR LAST ORDER ANDS ASK “WHATS NEW”![I]n order to establish a “change of circumstances,” a movant must prove that,since the entry of the last custody order, the conditions surrounding custody of thechild, which have or could have a significant effect on the child’s well-being,have materially changed.
NEW ,THAT SIGNIFICANTLY AFFECTS THE CHILDAgain, not just any change will suffice, for over timethere will always be some changes in a child’s environment, behavior, and wellbeing.
MORE THAN NORMAL LIFE CHANGESInstead, the evidence must demonstrate something more than the normallife changes (both good and bad) that occur during the life of a child, and theremust be at least some evidence that the material changes have had or will almostcertainly have an effect on the child. This too will be a determination made onthe basis of the facts of each case, with the relevance of the facts presented beinggauged by the statutory best interest factors. [Vodvarka, 259 Mich App at 512-514 (emphasis in original).]
FATHER SOUGHT A CHANGE IN CUSTODY !IN RETALIATION TO MOTHERS MOTION!In this case, defendant himself sought a change in custody, and in his petition for changeof custody, he argued that there had been a substantial change of circumstances since the entry ofthe judgment of divorce.
WHAT DID FATHER SAY THE CHANGE WAS?In his petition, defendant articulated numerous specific instances thatconstituted a change of circumstances, including…
ONEplaintiff’s strict enforcement of the parenting time schedule in the judgment of divorce,
TWOplaintiff’s violations of the inherent rights of the minor children,
THREEplaintiff’s refusal to let defendant see the minor children on a particular weekend for amatter of hours per defendant’s special request,
FOURplaintiff’s failure to pick up the children after defendant exercised parenting time with them,
FIVE…BINGO...IT'S ALL ABOUT BASEBALLproblems between the parties regarding one of the minor children’s participation on a baseball team that was coached by defendant, SIXand a conflict between the parties that resulted in a scene at the minor children’s baseball practice.
COURT DID NOT THINK DAD HAD ENOUGHThe MIDLAND CHILD CUSTODY trial court specifically rejected defendant’s contention that plaintiff’s Strict enforcement of the parenting time schedule in the judgment of divorce constituted a change incircumstances. In reviewing the specific instances cited by defendant, the trial court stated thatthe parties’ problems with co-parenting were more properly characterized as proper cause torevisit the custody order, rather than a change of circumstances sufficient to revisit custody:The specific instances raised by the Defendant in his petition were alsothoroughly discussed at the hearing through testimony by both parties and theirwitnesses.
MIDLAND CHILD CUSTODY COURT DECIDED THE PARENTS CANNOT CO- PARENTThe situations are clear illustrations of the parties’ current inability toco-parent their children in a manner geared toward the best interests of thechildren. The Court does not feel, however, that the contention between theparties is appropriately categorized as a change of circumstances.
WOW!.... I SHOULD HAVE THOUGHT OF THAT. ...IN JOINT, LACK OF CO-PARENTING IS A CHANGE IN CIRCUMSTANCESInstead, the coparenting problems should be classified as proper cause by which to revisit thecurrent order. The issues surrounding the parties’ inability to co-parent, and theinstances in which those issues have manifested themselves, are clearly relevantto the parties’ willingness and ability to encourage and facilitate a closerelationship between the child and the other parent. The facilitation andencouragement of such relationship is one of the twelve best interest factors, andbased on the testimony presented, the problems between the parties are having asignificant effect on the well-being of the children involved in this case.Therefore, the Court finds proper cause exists to revisit the current custody order.
DAD LOST HIS ABILITY TO CHALLENGE MOM'S LACK OF CHANGE IN CIRCUMSTANCES WHEN HE ARGUES IN HIS OWN PETITION THERE IS.It is arguable that defendant has waived his argument that there was not proper cause orchange of circumstances sufficient to revisit the custody order by asserting in his petition forchange of custody that there was proper cause to revisit the custody issue. Error requiringreversal cannot be error to which the aggrieved party contributed by plan or negligence. Peoplev Gonzalez, 256 Mich App 212, 224; 663 NW2d 499 (2003).
MIDLAND CHILD CUSTODY COURT SAID DAD DID NOT BRING ENOUGH TO THE TABLEEven if defendant has not waived his argument regarding the lack of proper cause or change of circumstances, his argument is without merit.
PRACTICE NOTE -MOTHER BROUGHT WITNESS TO COURT ON FATHERS NON ABILITY TO CO PARENT.Defendant argues that there was not proper cause to revisit the custody issuebecause the only testimony that the parties’ inability to co-parent the children was affecting thechildren came from plaintiff and plaintiff’s witnesses.
LOCAL COURT GETS TO LOOK AT CREDIBILITYDefendant’s argument in this regard essentially asks this Court to interfere with the factfinder’s duty to determine the credibility of witnesses and the weight of the evidence, something which this Court cannot do. MCR 2.613(C); Berger, 277 Mich App at 715.
MIDLAND CHILD CUSTODY COURT GOT IT RIGHTAs the trial court observed, one of the statutory bestinterest factors is “[t]he willingness and ability of each of the parties to facilitate and encourage aclose and continuing parent-child relationship between the child and the other parent or the childand the parents.” MCL 722.23(j). The trial court’s finding that the parties were unable to coparentand that this affected the parties’ ability to facilitate a close relationship between thechildren and the other parent was based on its determinations regarding the credibility of thewitnesses and its weighing of the evidence. The trial court’s findings were not against the greatweight of the evidence, and the trial court properly found that proper cause existed to revisit thecustody order.2.
ESTABLISHED CUSTODIAL ENVIRONMENTFATHER Defendant next argues that the trial court erred in ruling that an established custodialenvironment existed with respect to plaintiff and in ruling that there was no established custodialenvironment with respect to defendant. As noted above, whether an established custodialenvironment exists is a question of fact that this Court must affirm unless the trial court’s findingis against the great weight of the evidence. Berger, 277 Mich App at 706. “A finding is againstthe great weight of the evidence if the evidence clearly preponderates in the opposite direction.”Id. The trial court must address whether an established custodial environment exists before itmakes a determination regarding the child’s best interests. Mogle v Scriver, 241 Mich App 192,197; 614 NW2d 696 (2000).
WHAT IS AN ESTABISHED CUSTODIAL ENVIRONMENT?“An established custodial environment is one of significantduration in which a parent provides care, discipline, love, guidance, and attention that isappropriate to the age and individual needs of the child. ITS PHYSICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICALIt is both a physical and psychologicalenvironment that fosters a relationship between custodian and child and is marked by security,stability, and permanence.” Berger, 277 Mich App at 706, citing Baker v Baker, 411 Mich 567,579-580; 309 NW2d 532 (1981).
OVER A PERIOD OF TIMEAn established custodial environment exists “if over anappreciable time the child naturally looks to the custodian in that environment for guidance,discipline, the necessities of life, and parental comfort,” MCL 722.27(1)(c), and “the relationshipbetween the custodian and the child is marked by qualities of security, stability andpermanence.” Baker, 411 Mich at 579-580.
BOTH PARENTS CAN HAVE ITAn established custodial environment may existwith both parents where a child looks to both the mother and father for guidance, discipline, andthe necessities of life. Foskett, 247 Mich App at 8; Mogle, 241 Mich App at 197-198.The trial court found that there was an established custodial environment with plaintiff,but that there was not an established custodial environment with defendant:
MIDLAND CHILD CUSTODY COURT FINDS FOR MOMCourt finds that there is an established custodial environment with thePlaintiff in this case. WHY?
ONEPlaintiff was the children’s primary caregiver from theirbirth, staying home with the children while Defendant worked.
TWOThis arrangementcontinued until Defendant’s retirement in 2005. At that time, Plaintiff did returnto work, but she has continued to be a constant, positive presence in the children’slives.
THREEIt is clear that the children look to her for guidance, discipline, comfort andthe fulfillment of their needs.FOUROn the other hand, the relationship the boys have with their father has notbeen shown to be of the same positive nature as that with their mother. The boyshave spent more time with their father since his retirement than they did in thefirst years of their lives.
FIVEHowever, that time has been sporadic and not fosteredthe same type of relationship with their father as the boys have with their mother.
SIXThe time Defendant shares with the boys is primarily spent engaging in physicaland outdoor activities. It seems that the boys look to their father more as someoneto have fun with than someone who provides them guidance in their lives.
SEVENWhile it does appear that the boys listen to their father’s directives, they seem to do sobecause they fear his reactions more than they respect his authority as a parent.
DAD WAS NOT A PARENTING PARENTThe Court finds no established custodial environment with Defendant.The trial court’s finding that there was an established custodial environment between thechildren and plaintiff was not against the great weight of the evidence.
KIDS ARE MORE SECURE WITH MOMThere was evidence thatthe relationship between plaintiff and the children had qualities of security, stability, andpermanence.
MOMS HOME WAS THE PRIMARY RSSIDENCEFurthermore, plaintiff’s residence had been the children’s primary residence sincethe parties divorced in July 2007, and the children spend the majority of their days and nightswith plaintiff. As for defendant, the evidence does not clearly preponderate towards a finding ofan established custodial environment. According to defendant, the trial court downplayeddefendant’s role in the children’s lives and ignored credible witnesses that positively describedthe children’s relationship with defendant.
DAD DOES LOVE HIS CHILDRENIt is true that there was testimony that defendantloves his children and that he generally exercised his parenting time with the children,participated with their baseball and school activities, and enjoyed outdoor activities with them,such as hunting, fishing and golfing. Furthermore, there was testimony that defendant guidedand disciplined the children.
DADS HOME LACKED SECURITYHowever, there was also evidence that tended to show that therelationship between defendant and the children did not have qualities of security and stability.
ONE...DAD IS AN ANGRY GUYFor example, there was evidence that defendant sometimes became angry when the childrenwere present and that his anger affected the children,
TWO..DAD PUT THE DRAMA INFRONT OF THE CHILDRENthere was evidence that defendant made custodial exchanges traumatic, and there was evidence that defendant sometimes did not exercise his parenting time when he was expected to.
THREEFurthermore, there was evidence to support the trialcourt’s finding that defendant was the “fun” parent with whom the boys liked to hang out andhave a good time.
LOCAL COURT GETS TO DECIDETo the extent that the trial court’s conclusion that there was not an established custodialenvironment with defendant involved credibility determinations and the possible rejection ofevidence presented by defendant, we note that the existence of an established custodialenvironment is a factual inquiry, and we defer to the trial court’s determinations regarding theweight of the evidence and the credibility of witnesses. MCR 2.613(C); Berger, 277 Mich Appat 715. We find that the evidence does not clearly preponderate against the trial court’s findingsregarding the existence of an established custodial environment with respect to plaintiff and thelack of an established custodial environment with respect to defendant. The trial court’s findingswere not against the great weight of the evidence, and the trial court did not err in finding that anestablished custodial environment existed with plaintiff, but not with defendant.3.
STATUTORY BEST INTEREST FACTORSDefendant -FATHER next argues that the trial court’s findings with respect to the statutory bestinterest factors were against the great weight of the evidence.
BEST INTEREST FACTORSTo determine child custody, thetrial court must consider the statutory best interest factors in MCL 722.23:As used in this act, “best interests of the child” means the sum total of thefollowing factors to be considered, evaluated, and determined by the court:
(a) The love, affection, and other emotional ties existing between the partiesinvolved and the child.
(b) The capacity and disposition of the parties involved to give the child love,affection, and guidance and to continue the education and raising of the child inhis or her religion or creed, if any.
(c) The capacity and disposition of the parties involved to provide the childwith food, clothing, medical care or other remedial care recognized and permittedunder the laws of this state in place of medical care, and other material needs.
(d) The length of time the child has lived in a stable, satisfactory environment,and the desirability of maintaining continuity.
(e) The permanence, as a family unit, of the existing or proposed custodialhome or homes.
(f) The moral fitness of the parties involved.
(g) The mental and physical health of the parties involved.
(h) The home, school, and community record of the child.
(i) The reasonable preference of the child, if the court considers the child tobe of sufficient age to express preference.
(j) The willingness and ability of each of the parties to facilitate andencourage a close and continuing parent-child relationship between the child andthe other parent or the child and the parents.
(k) Domestic violence, regardless of whether the violence was directedagainst or witnessed by the child.
(l) Any other factor considered by the court to be relevant to a particular childcustody dispute.
The trial court found the parties equal for factors (c) and (f). The trial court found thatfactors (a), (b), and (h) favored plaintiff, that factor (d) slightly favored plaintiff, and that factors(e), (g), (j) and (k) strongly favored plaintiff. The trial court did not inverview the minorchildren and therefore did not favor either party under (i). Furthermore, the trial court did notconsider any other factor under (l).
AThe trial court found in plaintiff’s favor for factor (a). Defendant attacks the trial court’sfinding regarding this factor on the basis that the trial court disregarded the testimony ofunbiased defense witnesses. As the trier of fact, the trial court was in the best position todetermine the credibility of witnesses and determine what weight to give the evidence. MCR2.613(C); Berger, 277 Mich App at 715. The trial court apparently found the testimony ofplaintiff and her witnesses more credible in this regard than the testimony of defendant and hiswitnesses. The trial court’s finding for factor (a) was not against the great weight of theevidence.
BThe trial court also found in plaintiff’s favor for factor (b). The trial court found theparties’ capacity to continue the education and raising of the children as Catholics to besignificant regarding this factor and found that defendant was “not consistent with delivering theboys to religious activities during his parenting time.” There was evidence that plaintiff led thereligious training of the parties’ children and evidence regarding defendant’s lack of participationand involvement in the children’s religious education and even defendant’s inhibition of thechildren’s religious training. The trial court’s finding regarding this factor was not against thegreat weight of the evidence.
DThe trial court found that factor (d) slightly favored plaintiff because of the children’sfamiliarity with plaintiff’s home. Defendant argues that the trial court failed to note that theminor children had been spending significant time with defendant in defendant’s new home sinceJanuary 2007. This may be true, but the evidence established that the minor children spent themajority of their days and nights in plaintiff’s home and that the environment in plaintiff’s homewas stable. The trial court did not err in slightly favoring plaintiff under this factor.
EThe trial court found that factor (e) strongly favored plaintiff. There was evidence thatplaintiff, who had not remarried, was in a long-term relationship with a man and that the manresided in plaintiff’s home and had a good relationship with the minor children. Defendant hadjust remarried the very month of the custody trial. Defendant’s wife was a woman he had metonline. He met her in person for the first time in December 2008 and they spent some timetogether for about five weeks from March 25, 2009, until they were married on May 3, 2009.The minor children spent some time with defendant’s wife during these visits, but she did notappear to have given a lot of consideration to her role as step-mother to the minor children, asevidenced by her statement that she “never really thought about being their step-mom.”Defendant takes issue with the trial court’s conclusion that defendant places little valueon his relationships with women. It can be inferred from certain evidence that defendant placeslittle value on his relationships with women. There was evidence that defendant called plaintiffvulgar names, sometimes in the children’s presence, and he apparently dated a woman who hemet online because she lived near an author of books that one of his sons liked to read.According to defendant, “the only reason [he] wanted to interact with” the woman was to meetthis author. Thus, there was evidence to permit the inference to support the trial court’s findingthat defendant places little value on his relationships with women. Furthermore, given theevidence, and inferences therefrom, regarding the permanence of the parties’ respective homes,we conclude that the trial court’s finding regarding this factor was not against the great weight ofthe evidence.
GDefendant argues that the trial court erred in strongly favoring plaintiff under factor (g),the mental and physical health of the parties involved. Defendant was disabled from themilitary. He described the nature of his disability as including injuries to both knees and hisright shoulder. He also stated that he ingested gas during Operation Desert Storm and that hehad stomach problems and irritable bowel syndrome. Furthermore, defendant testified that hesuffered from depression, anxiety, and post-traumatic stress disorder. In contrast, plaintiff doesnot have any significant physical or mental health issues. The trial court’s finding regarding thisfactor was not against the great weight of the evidence.
HDefendant does not advance any meaningful argument that the trial court erred infavoring plaintiff under factor (h). “A party abandons a claim when it fails to make a meaningfulargument in support of its position.” Berger, 277 Mich App at 712.
JDefendant argues that the trial court wrongfully strongly favored plaintiff under factor (j).Defendant’s argument in this regard is limited to listing ways in which plaintiff attempted toundermine defendant’s relationship with the children. We again note that a party waives a claimby failing to make a meaningful argument in support of his position. Id. To the extent that thisfactor depended on credibility determinations, the trial court is in the best position to determinethe credibility of witnesses and weigh the evidence, and this Court must give deference to thetrial court’s superior abilities in this regard. MCR 2.613(C); Berger, 277 Mich App at 715.
KDefendant also argues that the trial court erred in strongly favoring plaintiff under factor(k), domestic violence. According to defendant, plaintiff was the controlling party, and she wasverbally and emotionally abusive. Defendant asserts that even though plaintiff called the policeon several occasions during the marriage, no police complaints were ever filed and defendantwas never charged with domestic violence. There was evidence that defendant blockedplaintiff’s car with his truck at a baseball game because he was angry at her, that he threatened to kill plaintiff’s boyfriend, that he was sometimes “volatile,” and that plaintiff had sought help from law enforcement on four occasions after the parties were separated because of defendant’sconduct. A woman who saw defendant block plaintiff’s car in at the baseball game laterapproached plaintiff and told plaintiff that she worked for a domestic violence and sexual assaultshelter and that plaintiff should call if she needed anything. Therefore, even without evidence ofa criminal complaint or that defendant was charged without domestic violence, the trial court’sfinding regarding this factor was not against the great weight of the evidence.In sum, the trial court’s findings of fact regarding the best interest factors were notagainst the great weight of the evidence.4.
DUE PROCESSDefendant finally argues that the trial court violated his due process right to a fairtribunal. According to defendant, the trial court violated his due process rights by failing to holda hearing to determine the preferences of the minor children, MCR 722.23(i), and by deferring tothe report of psychologist Dr. Tracy Allan without taking into consideration any of defendant’switnesses or exhibits in rendering its opinion.We review de novo issues of constitutional law. Sinicropi v Mazurek, 273 Mich App149, 155; 729 NW2d 256 (2006).
LIFE AND LIBERTYThe Michigan Constitution and the United States Constitution both preclude thegovernment from depriving a person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law. USConst, Am V; Const 1963, art 1, § 17; Reed v Reed, 265 Mich App 131, 159; 693 NW2d 825(2005). “Parents have a significant interest in the companionship, care, custody, andmanagement of their children, and the interest is an element of liberty protected by due process.”In re JK, 468 Mich 202, 210; 661 NW2d 216 (2003).
JUST WHAT IS DUE PROCESSThere are two types of due process:procedural due process and substantive due process. By Lo Oil Co v Dep’t of Treasury, 267Mich App 19, 32-33; 703 NW2d 822 (2005). Procedural due process requires notice and ameaningful opportunity to be heard before an impartial decision maker. Mettler Walloon, LLC vMelrose Twp, 281 Mich App 184, 213-214; 761 NW2d 293 (2008). Substantive due process isconcerned with the arbitrary deprivation of a liberty or property interest. Id. at 201.The trial court’s rejection of defendant’s witnesses and defendant’s own testimony andacceptance of plaintiff’s witnesses and evidence did not deprive defendant of his due processrights. Once again, defendant’s argument is tantamount to a rejection of the trial court’scredibility determinations. As stated previously, this Court defers to the trial court’s superiorability to make determinations regarding the credibility of witnesses and the weight of evidence.MCR 2.613(C); Berger, 277 Mich App at 715. The trial court’s apparent conclusion thatplaintiff’s evidence was more credible or that defendant’s evidence was incredible does not meanthat the trial court failed to consider defendant’s testimony and other evidence. The finder offact does not violate a party’s due process rights by finding the party’s evidence incredible orless credible than evidence presented by the opposing party. Furthermore, the fact that the trialcourt may not have mentioned certain portions of defendant’s evidence does not mean that thetrial court failed to consider defendant’s evidence. The trial court need not comment on everymatter in evidence. Sinicropi, 273 Mich App at 180. Defendant’s argument in this regard iswithout merit.In addition, the trial court did not violate defendant’s due process rights by not holding ahearing to determine the custody preferences of the minor children under MCL 722.23(i). Underfactor (i), the trial court must consider “[t]he reasonable preference of the child, if the courtconsiders the child to be of sufficient age to express preference.” MCL 722.23(i); Treutle vTreutle, 197 Mich App 690, 694; 495 NW2d 836 (1992). In this case, the minor children wereeight and ten years old at the time of trial. This Court has stated that children of six years of ageare generally old enough to express a preference. Bowers v Bowers, 190 Mich App 51, 55-56;475 NW2d 394 (1991). The trial court did not interview the minor children to ascertain theirpreferences.
SHOULD THE LOCAL COURT HAVE LISTENED CLOSER TO THE CHILDREN?Defendant cites Stringer v Vincent, 161 Mich App 429; 411 NW2d 474 (1987), in supportof his contention that the trial court violated his due process rights by failing to consider thereasonable preference of the children. In Stringer, which involved the defendant’s petition forchange of custody, this Court stated: “[t]he trial court’s failure to interview the children wasitself error requiring reversal.” Id. at 434. We find Stringer to be distinguishable from theinstant case, however, because in Stringer, the trial court made a custody decision withoutholding an evidentiary hearing at all, on the basis of the pleadings and a friend of the courtreport, which the parties had not agreed could be considered as evidence. Id. at 432-433. Wereversed because of the trial court’s failure to hold an evidentiary hearing and consider the bestinterest factors. Id. at 433. In so doing, we stated: “[t]he trial court could not have consideredthe eleven factors set out in the definition of a child’s best interests since it had been presentedwith no evidence.” Id. Unlike the facts in Stringer, in this case, the trial court held anevidentiary hearing and considered the best interest factors and made findings regarding thosefactors. Although the trial court did not ascertain the children’s preference under factor (i), itfound most of the best interest factors favored plaintiff (and that four factors “strongly” favoredplaintiff) and that the parties were equal for two factors. Significantly, the trial court did not findin defendant’s favor for any of the best interest factors. The trial court’s holding of anevidentiary hearing and consideration of the best interest factors in the instant case distinguishesit from Stringer. Furthermore, in requiring the trial court to interview the children to determinetheir preference in Stringer, this Court noted that its statements regarding factor (i) were madeonly “to provide guidance to the trial court on remand.” Id.
WE HAVE SAID THIS BEFOREMore recently, this Court has held that the trial court’s failure to consider the preferenceof the child under factor (i) does not require reversal if the parties did not ask the trial court tospeak to the child regarding his or her preference and the child’s preference would not havechanged the trial court’s ruling. Sinicropi, 273 Mich App at 182-183. In Sinicropi, we stated:[Defendant] also takes issue with the fact that the trial court did notconsider the child’s preference under factor i (child’s preference). The trial courtstated that it could not consider the child’s preference because none of the partiespresented him for an interview. We note that the parties stood mute when the trialcourt made this statement, and there is no indication in the record that [defendant]wished or requested that the trial court speak to the child regarding his preference.This fact distinguishes the case from Flaherty v Smith, 87 Mich App 561, 564-565; 274 NW2d 72 (1978); Lewis v Lewis, 73 Mich App 563, 564; 252 NW2d237 (1977), and In re Custody of James B, 66 Mich App 133, 134; 238 NW2d 550(1975), in which the trial court either declined or refused to interview the childrenon request. We recognize that “[a] trial court must consider, evaluate, anddetermine each of the factors contained in [MCL 722.23]” when determining achild’s best interests. Mann v Mann, 190 Mich App 526, 536; 476 NW2d 439(1991). Assuming that the child, who was six years old when the custody hearingwas conducted, was of sufficient age to express a preference, and assuming thatthe trial court erred in not interviewing the child when neither party apparentlywished to have the child appear, reversal is not warranted because had the childexpressed a preference, it would not have changed the trial court’s ruling, giventhe court’s overall statements and strong feelings regarding what was best for thechild . . . . [Sinicropi, 273 Mich App at 182-183.]The facts of the instant case are similar to the facts in Sinicropi. In this case, there is noindication that defendant presented the minor children to the court for an interview.2 Moreover,there is no indication that the trial court declined or refused to interview the children on request.In addition, even if defendant had asked the trial court to speak with the minor children toascertain their preference, in the present case, like in Sinicropi, the trial court’s findingsregarding the other best interest factors and statements regarding the best interests of the childrenindicate that the minor children’s preference would not have changed the trial court’s ruling. Inthe present case, the trial court did not find any of the best interest factors in favor of plaintiff.Moreover, even if the children had articulated a preference to be in the custody of defendant, thebest interest factors need not be given equal weight, McCain v McCain, 229 Mich App 123, 131;580 NW2d 485 (1998), and a child’s preference does not automatically outweigh all other bestinterest factors, Treutle, 197 Mich App at 694, which the trial court found primarily in favor of2 There is an indication that defendant wished to have the trial court speak with the minorchildren regarding their preference even though he did not present them to the trial court for aninterview. On the record on the last day of trial, May 28, 2009, the trial court stated that in lieuof closing arguments, it wanted the parties to prepare written proposed findings of fact andconclusions of law. The trial court stated that it would give the parties 14 days to prepare theseclosing briefs, which would have made them due on June 11, 2009. Thereafter, counsel forplaintiff advised the trial court that school for the minor children was out on June 12 and thatplaintiff “would appreciate any speed that you could lend to the decision, especially as it relatesto the summer break parenting time.” The trial court then stated that it was willing to shorten thetimetable to facilitate an earlier decision, but counsel for defendant made comments thatindicated that it would be difficult for her to complete the document any earlier than June 11,2009. The trial court ultimately left the June 11, 2009, deadline intact, and defendant filed hisclosing brief with the trial court on June 11, 2009. In his closing brief, defendant asserted that“the preference of the children should be determined by this court.” Under the facts of this case,such a statement, assuming that it constitutes a request that the trial court speak with the minorchildren to ascertain their preference, is not a timely request for the trial court to interview theminor children to ascertain their preferences, when there is no evidence that defendant had thechildren available so that the trial court could speak to them that day, and defendant knew thatthe children would be out of school on June 12, and knew that the trial court desired to issue itsdecision before that date. In fact, the trial court issued its order and opinion on June 11, 2009,and defendant’s brief on appeal indicates that the trial court actually rendered its opinion beforereceiving defendant’s closing brief, although it is impossible to verify this because there is notime stamp on either the closing brief or the opinion. Significantly, defendant’s motion forreconsideration did not include any argument regarding the trial court’s failure to ascertain theminor children’s preference under MCL 722.23(i).plaintiff. The trial court did not violate defendant’s due process rights by not interviewing theminor children to determine their preference under factor (i).
III. CONCLUSIONIn sum, the MIDLAND CHILD CUSTODY trial court’s findings regarding the existence of proper cause to revisit thecustody order were not against the great weight of the evidence. In addition, the trial court’sfindings regarding the existence of an established custodial environment with respect to plaintiffand defendant and regarding the best interest factors also were not against the great weight of theevidence. Finally, the trial court did not violate defendant’s due process rights by makingcredibility determinations in plaintiff’s favor and by not interviewing the minor children todetermine their preference.
MICHIGAN COURT OF APPEALS AGREES WITH THE MIDLAND CHILD CUSTODY COURTAffirmed. Plaintiff, being the prevailing party, may tax costs pursuant to MCR 7.219./s/ Richard A. Bandstra,/s/ Stephen L. Borrello,/s/ Douglas B. ShapiroPosted here by
Terry R. Bankerthttp://attorneybankert.com/Or http://dumpmyspouse.com/
[1]GenerallyS T A T E O F M I C H I G A N C O U R T O F A P P E A L S ,UNPUBLISHED opinion, May 25, 2010 ,v No. 294177Midland Circuit Court, LC No. 06-001485-DMLISA A. DOUGLAS, f/k/a LISA A. EATON, Plaintiff-Appellee,RUSSELL E. EATON, Defendant-Appellant.Before: BANDSTRA, P.J., and BORRELLO and SHAPIRO, JJ.PER CURIAM.,e-Journal Number: 45946.Posted here by Flint Divorce Attorney Terry Bankert whose comments are CAP headline or [] for purposes or lay understanding and SEO.
Thursday, March 11, 2010
100 Mile rule
100 Mile rule! Thoughts from a Flint Divorce Lawyer.
Issues Discussed here by Terry Bankert a Flint Divorce Attorney:
Child custody;
Motion for a change of domicile; Brown v. Loveman; Mogle v. Scriver; Shulick v. Richards; MCL 722.31; Factors a, b, and c; Spires v. Bergman
From Court: Michigan Court of Appeals (Unpublished)
The Case Name: Woodward v. Woodward
Reviewed first at e-Journal Number: 45255
Michigan Court of Appeals Judge(s): Per Curiam - Servitto, Bandstra, and Fort Hood
When did the lower court release this? March 4, 2010, No. 294441,
Where did this case begin? Lapeer Circuit Court,LC No. 08-040752-DM
DID YOU KNOW
In My Flint Divorce and Statewide mediation practice often one parent wants to move. Did you know that when parents share joint legal custody of their children and one parent proposes to
relocate more than 100 miles away, a motion for change of domicile is governed by MCL
722.31. Spires v Bergman, 276 Mich App 432, 436-437; 741 NW2d 523 (2007); Rittershaus v
Rittershaus, 273 Mich App 462, 465; 730 NW2d 262 (2007). That statute provides, in pertinent
part: Before permitting a legal residence change. . . , the court shall consider
each of the following factors, with the child as the primary focus in the court’s
deliberations:
(a) Whether the legal residence change has the capacity to improve the
quality of life for both the child and the relocating parent.
(b) The degree to which each parent has complied with, and utilized his or
her time under, a court order governing parenting time with the child, and whether
the parent’s plan to change the child’s legal residence is inspired by that parent’s
desire to defeat or frustrate the parenting time schedule.
(c) The degree to which the court is satisfied that, if the court permits the
legal residence change, it is possible to order a modification of the parenting time
schedule and other arrangements governing the child’s schedule in a manner that
can provide an adequate basis for preserving and fostering the parental
relationship between the child and each parent; and whether each parent is likely
to comply with the modification.
(d) The extent to which the parent opposing the legal residence change is
motivated by a desire to secure a financial advantage with respect to a support
obligation.
(e) Domestic violence, regardless of whether the violence was directed
against or witnessed by the child. [MCL 722.31(4).]
IN THIS CASE
The Lapeer County Family court decision to grant the plaintiff-mother's motion for change of domicile was not an abuse of discretion. dad thought it was a bad decision. He was wrong.
IMPROVING THE CHILDS LIFE
These parents shared joint custody of their minor children. Father claimed the trial court erred by finding factor (a) favored permitting the relocation because mother failed to establish a move to Massachusetts would improve the quality of the children's lives.
MABEY COUNTS IN FAMILY COURT
Mother was not required to prove the move would improve the quality of their lives, only it had the capacity to do so.
CHILDS QUALITY OF LIFE STAYS THE SAME, EXCEPT FOR NOT SEEING DAD AS MUCH!
The Lapper Family Court found, the evidence showed the children would have basically the same lifestyle regardless of where they lived, apart from the diminution in time spent with defendant.
MOTHER WAS MOVING TO A GOOD HOME
There was a suitable home in a suitable neighborhood in both communities, there were good schools in both communities, the children had friends in both communities, and they had a chance to see nearby relatives in both communities.
MOM THE PROVIDER LOST HER JOB, MOVED TO FIND ANOTHER
However, mother , who had been the children's sole source of financial support because father was unemployed, had lost her job and been unable to find new employment in Michigan, but she had some work available to her immediately in Massachusetts.
IF MOM STAYS IN MICHIGAN CHILD FINANCIALLY HARMED
The trial court tacitly recognized if mother were to remain in Michigan without work, the children's quality of life could be detrimentally affected.
MOM WINS FACTOR A
Thus, the trial court's conclusion with respect to factor (a) was not against the great weight of the evidence.
DAD DID NOT USE ALL THE PARENTING TIME THE COURT HAD ORDERED
As to factor (b), the Lapeer court found father had not taken full advantage of his parenting time.
DAD WAS THE BABY SITTER
Although the custody and support order entered in 2005 was not admitted into evidence, he admitted it gave him parenting time for half the summer and he had not exercised the time, apparently because of all the extra time he spent babysitting the children.
DAD STEPPED TO THE ;PLATE AND TOOK CARE OF THE CHILDREN WHILE MOM AT WORK! COURT SAYS THAT’S NO ENOUGH!
While father was seeing the children on a regular basis almost daily, the time spent with them for a few hours while mother was at work and on alternate weekends was not the same as being a full-time parent for five or six weeks at a time.
MOM WINS FACTOR B
Thus, the Lapeer court's conclusion with respect to this aspect of factor (b) was not against the great weight of the evidence.
COURT SAYS EVEN WITH THE 1000 MILE MOVE DAD CAN STILL BNE THE SAME KIND OF DAD TO THESE KIDS.
As to (c), the Lapeer court found it would be possible to work out a new visitation schedule adequate to preserve defendant's relationship with the children. This finding was supported by mothers testimony father had maintained regular telephone contact with the children during an extended vacation to Massachusetts, and by her testimony regarding a proposed visitation schedule.
MOM WINS FACTOR C.
Thus, the trial court's conclusion with respect to this aspect of factor (c) was not against the great weight of the evidence. Defendant did not challenge the trial court's findings regarding factors (d) and (e).
DO YOU BELIEVE THAT WAS THE RIGHT CONCLUSION?
SOMETIMES THE LAW IS USED TO REACH THE CONCLUSION THE COURT WANTS.
WHAT WAS THIS LAW?
1. Local courts like Lapeer have great discretion. For a higher court to reveres a lower court it must find abuse. Good luck with that one. An abuse of discretion in matters involving child custody exists
where the result is so palpably and grossly violative of fact and logic that it evidences a
perversity of will or the exercise of passion or bias. Shulick v Richards, 273 Mich App 320, 324-
325; 729 NW2d 533 (2006).
2.When mom and dad share joint legal custody of their children and one parent proposes to
relocate more than 100 miles away, a motion for change of domicile is governed by MCL
722.31. Spires v Bergman, 276 Mich App 432, 436-437; 741 NW2d 523 (2007); Rittershaus v
Rittershaus, 273 Mich App 462, 465; 730 NW2d 262 (2007).
3.That statute MCL 722.31 says:
Before permitting a legal residence change. . . , the court shall consider
each of the following factors, with the child as the primary focus in the court’s
deliberations:
(a) Whether the legal residence change has the capacity to improve the
quality of life for both the child and the relocating parent.
(b) The degree to which each parent has complied with, and utilized his or
her time under, a court order governing parenting time with the child, and whether
the parent’s plan to change the child’s legal residence is inspired by that parent’s
desire to defeat or frustrate the parenting time schedule.
(c) The degree to which the court is satisfied that, if the court permits the
legal residence change, it is possible to order a modification of the parenting time
schedule and other arrangements governing the child’s schedule in a manner that
can provide an adequate basis for preserving and fostering the parental
relationship between the child and each parent; and whether each parent is likely
to comply with the modification.
(d) The extent to which the parent opposing the legal residence change is
motivated by a desire to secure a financial advantage with respect to a support
obligation.
(e) Domestic violence, regardless of whether the violence was directed
against or witnessed by the child. [MCL 722.31(4).]
4. Mom had the burden of bringing the evidence. The party , mom here, seeking a change of domicile has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the
evidence that the change is warranted. Brown, 260 Mich App at 600.
5. The high court did not say it was the right decision only that the decision allowing mom to
change domicile was not an abuse of discretion.
Posted here byTerry Bankert
www.attorneybankert.com
Find your county Family Court House State Wide.
www.dumpmyspouse.com
Issues Discussed here by Terry Bankert a Flint Divorce Attorney:
Child custody;
Motion for a change of domicile; Brown v. Loveman; Mogle v. Scriver; Shulick v. Richards; MCL 722.31; Factors a, b, and c; Spires v. Bergman
From Court: Michigan Court of Appeals (Unpublished)
The Case Name: Woodward v. Woodward
Reviewed first at e-Journal Number: 45255
Michigan Court of Appeals Judge(s): Per Curiam - Servitto, Bandstra, and Fort Hood
When did the lower court release this? March 4, 2010, No. 294441,
Where did this case begin? Lapeer Circuit Court,LC No. 08-040752-DM
DID YOU KNOW
In My Flint Divorce and Statewide mediation practice often one parent wants to move. Did you know that when parents share joint legal custody of their children and one parent proposes to
relocate more than 100 miles away, a motion for change of domicile is governed by MCL
722.31. Spires v Bergman, 276 Mich App 432, 436-437; 741 NW2d 523 (2007); Rittershaus v
Rittershaus, 273 Mich App 462, 465; 730 NW2d 262 (2007). That statute provides, in pertinent
part: Before permitting a legal residence change. . . , the court shall consider
each of the following factors, with the child as the primary focus in the court’s
deliberations:
(a) Whether the legal residence change has the capacity to improve the
quality of life for both the child and the relocating parent.
(b) The degree to which each parent has complied with, and utilized his or
her time under, a court order governing parenting time with the child, and whether
the parent’s plan to change the child’s legal residence is inspired by that parent’s
desire to defeat or frustrate the parenting time schedule.
(c) The degree to which the court is satisfied that, if the court permits the
legal residence change, it is possible to order a modification of the parenting time
schedule and other arrangements governing the child’s schedule in a manner that
can provide an adequate basis for preserving and fostering the parental
relationship between the child and each parent; and whether each parent is likely
to comply with the modification.
(d) The extent to which the parent opposing the legal residence change is
motivated by a desire to secure a financial advantage with respect to a support
obligation.
(e) Domestic violence, regardless of whether the violence was directed
against or witnessed by the child. [MCL 722.31(4).]
IN THIS CASE
The Lapeer County Family court decision to grant the plaintiff-mother's motion for change of domicile was not an abuse of discretion. dad thought it was a bad decision. He was wrong.
IMPROVING THE CHILDS LIFE
These parents shared joint custody of their minor children. Father claimed the trial court erred by finding factor (a) favored permitting the relocation because mother failed to establish a move to Massachusetts would improve the quality of the children's lives.
MABEY COUNTS IN FAMILY COURT
Mother was not required to prove the move would improve the quality of their lives, only it had the capacity to do so.
CHILDS QUALITY OF LIFE STAYS THE SAME, EXCEPT FOR NOT SEEING DAD AS MUCH!
The Lapper Family Court found, the evidence showed the children would have basically the same lifestyle regardless of where they lived, apart from the diminution in time spent with defendant.
MOTHER WAS MOVING TO A GOOD HOME
There was a suitable home in a suitable neighborhood in both communities, there were good schools in both communities, the children had friends in both communities, and they had a chance to see nearby relatives in both communities.
MOM THE PROVIDER LOST HER JOB, MOVED TO FIND ANOTHER
However, mother , who had been the children's sole source of financial support because father was unemployed, had lost her job and been unable to find new employment in Michigan, but she had some work available to her immediately in Massachusetts.
IF MOM STAYS IN MICHIGAN CHILD FINANCIALLY HARMED
The trial court tacitly recognized if mother were to remain in Michigan without work, the children's quality of life could be detrimentally affected.
MOM WINS FACTOR A
Thus, the trial court's conclusion with respect to factor (a) was not against the great weight of the evidence.
DAD DID NOT USE ALL THE PARENTING TIME THE COURT HAD ORDERED
As to factor (b), the Lapeer court found father had not taken full advantage of his parenting time.
DAD WAS THE BABY SITTER
Although the custody and support order entered in 2005 was not admitted into evidence, he admitted it gave him parenting time for half the summer and he had not exercised the time, apparently because of all the extra time he spent babysitting the children.
DAD STEPPED TO THE ;PLATE AND TOOK CARE OF THE CHILDREN WHILE MOM AT WORK! COURT SAYS THAT’S NO ENOUGH!
While father was seeing the children on a regular basis almost daily, the time spent with them for a few hours while mother was at work and on alternate weekends was not the same as being a full-time parent for five or six weeks at a time.
MOM WINS FACTOR B
Thus, the Lapeer court's conclusion with respect to this aspect of factor (b) was not against the great weight of the evidence.
COURT SAYS EVEN WITH THE 1000 MILE MOVE DAD CAN STILL BNE THE SAME KIND OF DAD TO THESE KIDS.
As to (c), the Lapeer court found it would be possible to work out a new visitation schedule adequate to preserve defendant's relationship with the children. This finding was supported by mothers testimony father had maintained regular telephone contact with the children during an extended vacation to Massachusetts, and by her testimony regarding a proposed visitation schedule.
MOM WINS FACTOR C.
Thus, the trial court's conclusion with respect to this aspect of factor (c) was not against the great weight of the evidence. Defendant did not challenge the trial court's findings regarding factors (d) and (e).
DO YOU BELIEVE THAT WAS THE RIGHT CONCLUSION?
SOMETIMES THE LAW IS USED TO REACH THE CONCLUSION THE COURT WANTS.
WHAT WAS THIS LAW?
1. Local courts like Lapeer have great discretion. For a higher court to reveres a lower court it must find abuse. Good luck with that one. An abuse of discretion in matters involving child custody exists
where the result is so palpably and grossly violative of fact and logic that it evidences a
perversity of will or the exercise of passion or bias. Shulick v Richards, 273 Mich App 320, 324-
325; 729 NW2d 533 (2006).
2.When mom and dad share joint legal custody of their children and one parent proposes to
relocate more than 100 miles away, a motion for change of domicile is governed by MCL
722.31. Spires v Bergman, 276 Mich App 432, 436-437; 741 NW2d 523 (2007); Rittershaus v
Rittershaus, 273 Mich App 462, 465; 730 NW2d 262 (2007).
3.That statute MCL 722.31 says:
Before permitting a legal residence change. . . , the court shall consider
each of the following factors, with the child as the primary focus in the court’s
deliberations:
(a) Whether the legal residence change has the capacity to improve the
quality of life for both the child and the relocating parent.
(b) The degree to which each parent has complied with, and utilized his or
her time under, a court order governing parenting time with the child, and whether
the parent’s plan to change the child’s legal residence is inspired by that parent’s
desire to defeat or frustrate the parenting time schedule.
(c) The degree to which the court is satisfied that, if the court permits the
legal residence change, it is possible to order a modification of the parenting time
schedule and other arrangements governing the child’s schedule in a manner that
can provide an adequate basis for preserving and fostering the parental
relationship between the child and each parent; and whether each parent is likely
to comply with the modification.
(d) The extent to which the parent opposing the legal residence change is
motivated by a desire to secure a financial advantage with respect to a support
obligation.
(e) Domestic violence, regardless of whether the violence was directed
against or witnessed by the child. [MCL 722.31(4).]
4. Mom had the burden of bringing the evidence. The party , mom here, seeking a change of domicile has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the
evidence that the change is warranted. Brown, 260 Mich App at 600.
5. The high court did not say it was the right decision only that the decision allowing mom to
change domicile was not an abuse of discretion.
Posted here byTerry Bankert
www.attorneybankert.com
Find your county Family Court House State Wide.
www.dumpmyspouse.com
Tuesday, October 14, 2008
Midland County temporary restraing order divorce
Midland County :DIVORCE TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER
What is a temporary restraining order from a Midland County County Family Court?
Requirements for a Midland County Divorce Attorney seeking and the court granting a temporary restraining order (TRO): Midland County Fathers Rights , Childrens Rights and Midland County Mothers Rights equally apply.
It clearly appears from specific facts, as Prepared by a Midland County Divorce Lawyer, shown in an affidavit or a verified pleading that immediate and irreparable injury, loss, or damage will result to the applicant from the delay required to effect notice, or that notice itself will precipitate adverse action before an order can be entered.
The applicant’s Midland County Attorney certifies in writing any efforts to give notice and why notice should not be required.
A permanent record , By A Midland County Family Court Judge, is made of non written evidence, arguments, or representations supporting the application. A record is what is done in front of a Midland County Family Court Judge after the case is called. The record is produced by ordering transcripts.
The order, prepared by your Midland County Divorce attorney, must be (1) endorsed with the date and time it is issued, (2) describe the injury and why it is irreparable, and (3) state why the order was granted without notice.
Domestic relations TROs (unlike others) need not expire within a fixed period, and the court need not set a date for further hearing.
Motions for Temporary Orders as prepared by your Midland County Divorce Lawyer outline follows;
A Midland County Lawyer will prepare your Motions for temporary orders . Midland County attorney pleadings typically concern Midland County child custody and Midland County support, Midland County parenting time adjustments, marital restraints on distributing property, residence in the marital home, sometimes called exclusive use of the marital home, and requests for Midland County attorney fees.
A Midland County Lawyer’ s motion for a temporary order differs from an ex parte order in that it may not be granted without a hearing, unless the parties agree otherwise. MCR 3.207©)(2).
The motion may be made , by your Midland County Legal Counsel, at any time during the pendency of a case by filing a verified motion setting forth facts sufficient to support the relief requested. MCR 3.207©)(1).
Other provisions regarding the Midland County Divorce temporary order include the following:
The Midland County Divorce order may be modified at any time, following a hearing and on a showing of good cause.
The Midland County Divorce order must state its effective date and whether it may be modified retroactively by a subsequent order.
The Midland County Divorce order remains in effect until modified or until entry of the final judgment or order.
The Midland County Divorce Temporary order vacated by entry of the final judgment or order, unless specifically continued or preserved. An exception is support arrearage that have been assigned to the state.
MCR 3.207©)(3)–(6).
Your Midland County Judge may not grant exclusive use of the marital home to one party in the absence of evidence of abusive conduct, a risk of physical harm, or conduct detrimental psychologically or emotionally to the children. That the petitioner is "uncomfortable" with the living arrangement probably does not justify depriving the other party of a residence.
At any time, a Midland County Divorce party may request that the court order the other party to pay all or part of the attorney fees and expenses related to the action or a specific proceeding, including a Midland County post judgment proceeding. The motion must allege facts sufficient to show that the petitioner is unable to bear the expense and that the other party is able to pay. Alternatively, the motion must allege facts sufficient to show that the fees and expenses were incurred because the other party was able to comply with a previous court order but refused. MCR 3.206©).
Posted here by
Terry Bankert
http://attorneybankert.com/
and
http://dumpmyspouse.com
What is a temporary restraining order from a Midland County County Family Court?
Requirements for a Midland County Divorce Attorney seeking and the court granting a temporary restraining order (TRO): Midland County Fathers Rights , Childrens Rights and Midland County Mothers Rights equally apply.
It clearly appears from specific facts, as Prepared by a Midland County Divorce Lawyer, shown in an affidavit or a verified pleading that immediate and irreparable injury, loss, or damage will result to the applicant from the delay required to effect notice, or that notice itself will precipitate adverse action before an order can be entered.
The applicant’s Midland County Attorney certifies in writing any efforts to give notice and why notice should not be required.
A permanent record , By A Midland County Family Court Judge, is made of non written evidence, arguments, or representations supporting the application. A record is what is done in front of a Midland County Family Court Judge after the case is called. The record is produced by ordering transcripts.
The order, prepared by your Midland County Divorce attorney, must be (1) endorsed with the date and time it is issued, (2) describe the injury and why it is irreparable, and (3) state why the order was granted without notice.
Domestic relations TROs (unlike others) need not expire within a fixed period, and the court need not set a date for further hearing.
Motions for Temporary Orders as prepared by your Midland County Divorce Lawyer outline follows;
A Midland County Lawyer will prepare your Motions for temporary orders . Midland County attorney pleadings typically concern Midland County child custody and Midland County support, Midland County parenting time adjustments, marital restraints on distributing property, residence in the marital home, sometimes called exclusive use of the marital home, and requests for Midland County attorney fees.
A Midland County Lawyer’ s motion for a temporary order differs from an ex parte order in that it may not be granted without a hearing, unless the parties agree otherwise. MCR 3.207©)(2).
The motion may be made , by your Midland County Legal Counsel, at any time during the pendency of a case by filing a verified motion setting forth facts sufficient to support the relief requested. MCR 3.207©)(1).
Other provisions regarding the Midland County Divorce temporary order include the following:
The Midland County Divorce order may be modified at any time, following a hearing and on a showing of good cause.
The Midland County Divorce order must state its effective date and whether it may be modified retroactively by a subsequent order.
The Midland County Divorce order remains in effect until modified or until entry of the final judgment or order.
The Midland County Divorce Temporary order vacated by entry of the final judgment or order, unless specifically continued or preserved. An exception is support arrearage that have been assigned to the state.
MCR 3.207©)(3)–(6).
Your Midland County Judge may not grant exclusive use of the marital home to one party in the absence of evidence of abusive conduct, a risk of physical harm, or conduct detrimental psychologically or emotionally to the children. That the petitioner is "uncomfortable" with the living arrangement probably does not justify depriving the other party of a residence.
At any time, a Midland County Divorce party may request that the court order the other party to pay all or part of the attorney fees and expenses related to the action or a specific proceeding, including a Midland County post judgment proceeding. The motion must allege facts sufficient to show that the petitioner is unable to bear the expense and that the other party is able to pay. Alternatively, the motion must allege facts sufficient to show that the fees and expenses were incurred because the other party was able to comply with a previous court order but refused. MCR 3.206©).
Posted here by
Terry Bankert
http://attorneybankert.com/
and
http://dumpmyspouse.com
Monday, October 13, 2008
No Fault in Midland County, DIVORCE
What is a no-fault divorce?In Midland County Mi USA -A no-fault divorce is one in which neither spouse (husband or wife) blames the other in court documents for the breakdown of the marriage.
You should consult an attorney / lawyer for your divorce. To find an attorney contact dumpmyspouse , or attorneybankert ( Terry Bankert). Just google these names.
Your Midland Attorney will tell you no accusations or need to prove "guilt" or cause of the breakdown are required in a Midland Divorce.
Your Midland Lawyer will tell you A common basis for a no-fault divorce is "irreconcilable differences" or "irretrievable marriage breakdown."In a simple divorce or a contested one ,As those terms imply, the marriage is considered to be over, but the court and the legal documents do not try to assign blame.
You may have a legal separation or an informal one.
Your Midland Divorce Attorney will advise: Another common basis for no-fault divorce is the parties living separately for a certain period of time, such as for six months or a year, with the intent that the separation be permanent.Fault can be used to decide who gets what property.
By Terry Bankert
You should consult an attorney / lawyer for your divorce. To find an attorney contact dumpmyspouse , or attorneybankert ( Terry Bankert). Just google these names.
Your Midland Attorney will tell you no accusations or need to prove "guilt" or cause of the breakdown are required in a Midland Divorce.
Your Midland Lawyer will tell you A common basis for a no-fault divorce is "irreconcilable differences" or "irretrievable marriage breakdown."In a simple divorce or a contested one ,As those terms imply, the marriage is considered to be over, but the court and the legal documents do not try to assign blame.
You may have a legal separation or an informal one.
Your Midland Divorce Attorney will advise: Another common basis for no-fault divorce is the parties living separately for a certain period of time, such as for six months or a year, with the intent that the separation be permanent.Fault can be used to decide who gets what property.
By Terry Bankert
Sunday, September 28, 2008
Midland County
Midland
http://www.co.midland.mi.us/
220 W Ellsworth StMidland, MI 48640(989) 832-6775
Area: 521 smEst: 1850Pop: 82,874Pop/sm: 159.0Seat: Midland
http://www.co.midland.mi.us/
220 W Ellsworth StMidland, MI 48640(989) 832-6775
Area: 521 smEst: 1850Pop: 82,874Pop/sm: 159.0Seat: Midland
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